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Mission Impossible
Why Crisis Management Missions Do Not Increase the Visibility of 
the European Union
Stephanie B. Anderson
Abstract
The European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions are tools used to increase the international profile of the EU. 
Using three different databases, this study features a content analysis that evaluates how much and what 
kind of media coverage CSDP missions receive. In general, the news coverage is positive, but limited. This 
article argues that the problem is structural: the very nature of the missions themselves, whether EU or 
NATO, makes them poor vehicles for EU promotion for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. By 
definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making news coverage politically sensitive. The very 
act of reporting could undermine the mission. Institutionally, all CSDP missions are intergovernmental; 
therefore, the member states control the coverage. Logistically, the missions are usually located in remote, 
undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international journal-
ists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. The author concludes 
that although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfill  their primary political function of raising 
the profile of the EU.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has initiated more than 25 crisis management missions around the world 
since 2003. United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that “the United Nations and the 
European Union have been maintaining a special partnership”, and expressed his “deep admiration and ap-
preciation of what the European Union has been doing in terms of peace and prosperity as well as the pro-
tection and enhancement of human rights, climate change and the fight against terrorism” (Spokesperson 
of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP 2007). In a response to the question “who will 
die for Europe”, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer replied, “European soldiers are facing danger 
in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo. (…) They are there as members of national contingents, but they are 
serving a wider interest - Europe’s. There is a soul, (…) [t]here is a spirit. And people die for Europe, and 
have died” (Bernstein 2005). Nevertheless, these missions garner so little media coverage that increasing 
their visibility will be an agenda item for the European Council in December 2013, and not for the first time.
Commission spokeswoman Pia Arkenhilde explained, 
it’s obvious that visibility is part of being effective. It’s important for the recipients of the aid to know 
who they are dealing with and for the European tax payer, the donors of the aid, to see the actions on 
the ground, in terms of their future engagement (Rettman 2010).
 Is there anything the EU can do to increase the visibility of CSDP missions? Very little. The very nature of the 
missions, whether the sponsoring organization is the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
limits the use of crisis management missions as tools of self-promotion. Even when CSDP missions are suc-
cessful, their attributes make EU publicity extremely difficult. First, politically, they are almost always the 
result of closed-door negotiations, and, therefore, do not lend themselves to publicity. Since the member 
states are the ones risking blood and treasure, that is their soldiers and their tax revenues, contributing 
member state governments take all the credit when the mission is a success and blame the EU when there 
is a problem. Logistically, CSDP missions are usually located in remote, undeveloped parts of the world, 
often without a thriving, local free press, making it difficult and expensive for European and international 
journalists to cover. However, the lack of press coverage may increase the potential success of the mis-
sion by playing a low profile and giving a greater impression of local ownership to the crisis management. 
Although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfill their primary political function of raising the 
profile of the EU. 
The first section of the paper explains the political premise of using CSDP missions to showcase the EU. 
Next, using data from a quantitative content analysis, the author demonstrates that this policy disappoints; 
in general, CSDP missions gather very little news coverage and do not succeed in raising the Union’s profile. 
However, a secondary investigation into comparator missions in NATO demonstrates that the problem is 
not the EU’s alone. The paper then uses a qualitative analysis to explain how the very nature of CSDP mis-
sions undermines their use as a political promotion tool.
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2. Visibility and the CSDP: Increasing the EU’s International Prestige and Support  
 Among its Citizens1
The EU’s foreign and security policy is supposed to increase the profile of the EU both at home and abroad. 
The 1993 Maastricht Treaty on European Union stated that one of the main goals of the newly estab-
lished CFSP was to “assert its identity on the international scene”. This goal was reiterated in the Saint-
Mâlo Declaration in December 1998, which led to the formation of the subsequent European Security 
and Defense Policy2 “in order that Europe c[ould] make its voice heard in world affairs” (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the UK 1998).  According to the 2003 Concept for EU Monitoring Missions, one 
of the “basic principles” was to “enhance EU visibility” (Council of the European Union 2003). In 2010, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) was established with the same goal in mind: to “increase the 
Union’s political and economic influence in the world” (Council of the European Union 2010). 
Many member states have called for measures to increase press coverage of the CSDP as a way of gaining 
international respect and internal public support for the European project. Luxembourg, which held the EU 
presidency during the first half of 2005, made the issue of ESDP promotion a main talking point. Although 
lengthy, this quotation is instructive. 
To achieve the goal of an improved and enhanced communication strategy, there is no secret: explain, 
popularize, envelop it in common language at the same time as debating its objectives and concepts 
in order to spread it among the public. In most of the European societies, where armed conflicts have 
a bad reputation and where the horrors of war are still profoundly anchored, speaking about security 
and defence often awakens suspicion and provokes a sense of unease which it is difficult to get rid of. 
Nonetheless, stereotypes and misleading sentiments tend to stay on forever. Therefore, in order to 
convince, the European Union and the Member States have to become even more active and have 
to develop a true communication strategy on ESDP. The objective of this strategy should be to rally 
public opinion around a policy and to legitimate the ESDP by a strong parliamentary and popular 
support [sic, but emphasis added] (Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2005).
Academic research supports the claims made above: media coverage, provided it is both visible and consis-
tent, can change public opinion regarding the EU (de Vreese/Boomgaarden 2006 : 419). 
 In April 2006, the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly, comprised of members of the national parlia-
ments, sponsored a report that determined that neither the media nor the people were paying enough at-
tention. The rapporteur concluded, “the EU’s role in the security of the region [during the ALTHEA Mission 
to Bosnia] had not contributed as much as might be hoped towards enhancing the way in which the ESDP 
was perceived by the public at large [emphasis added]” (Assembly of the Western European Union 2006a). 
Therefore, “tangible results” needed to be made “clearer and more accessible to the public” (Assembly of 
the Western European Union 2006b). Just a few weeks later, the UK Parliament hosted a two-day seminar 
on “Building a secure Europe in a better world: Parliamentary responsibility and action in shaping public 
opinion on security and defence.” 
1  For a more in-depth analysis of CSDP role in identity or nation building in the EU, see Anderson (2008).
2  The Lisbon Treaty later changed the name of the policy to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
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Decision-makers continued to remark on the limited media coverage and public support of CSDP mission 
in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a 
Changing World:
Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where 
media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining 
our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the 
world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this 
contributes to security at home (Council of the European Union 2008: 12).
Within the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), other member states have continued to voice 
their concern over lack of visibility regarding EU actions overseas. In a non-public white paper, sponsored 
by Greece in 2010, to the PSC titled “Enhancing the EU’s public diplomacy: Better visibility and efficiency in 
EU’s foreign actions The role of the E.E.A.S. and of the PSC” the Greek government called upon the EEAS to 
take measures to increase the visibility of the EU on the world stage declaring “the perception of the EU by 
the local population and appreciation of its role [...] is not proportionate to the huge political and financial 
capital provided by the EU.”3 Both the European Councils of December 2012 and December 2013 have 
underlined the importance of increasing the visibility of the CSDP (European Council 2012: 10).4
3. The Media Coverage of CSDP Missions: Little Mention and Little Debate
In general, all the CSDP missions have been successful insofar as they have accomplished their mission, had 
minimal loss of life, and cost relatively little. Certainly, there have been some mildly embarrassing stories, 
for example, when Iraqis participating in EULEX Iraq, brought to the Netherlands for judicial training, snuck 
out to seek asylum in Sweden,5 but, not only have been no Srebrenicas6, there have been almost no cases 
of misbehaving military or civilian workers. As Luc Frieden, Luxembourg minister and President-in-office of 
the Council explained, “European soldiers in the world are like our visiting card” (as cited in Agence Europe 
2005: 4). Therefore, the Council adopted standards of behavior to be applied to all categories of personnel 
involved in ESDP operations. Any violation of human rights is to be reported, and all are to respect the 
ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of the local population. Drug use and sexual exploitation are forbid-
den: “It is a code of conduct so that EU soldiers are worthy representatives of the EU in difficult missions 
throughout the world” (as cited in Agence Europe 2005: 4). This record is a significant accomplishment, and 
yet, the media have mostly ignored the CSDP missions. 
3  An internal EU document cited by Paul Sturm (2010: 1). 
4  Increasing visibility for the CSDP has also been made an agenda item for the future European Council in December 
2013.
5  Interview with Dutch official from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the European Union, 8 November 
2005, Brussels, Belgium. 
6  The July 1995 Srebrenica massacre or genocide during the Bosnian war refers to the killing of 8,000 Bosniaks or 
Bosnian Muslims in an enclave designated a “safe area” under UN protection. The 400 Dutch peacekeepers on the 
ground were unable to prevent the massacre.
8 | KFG Working Paper No. 58 | December 2013 
To give an idea of how many hits a term can get using Google News archives, that is, searching 25,000 
global news sources for the entirety of its archives from 2004 onwards, at one end of the spectrum is 
U.S. President Barack Obama with 48,800,000 hits. The EU gets 7,250,000 hits. The Euro crisis gathers 
1,700,000 hits. German Chancellor Angela Merkel gets 1,480,000 hits. European Commission president 
Jose Manuel Barroso has 168,000. Compared to other general search terms regarding European security, 
anything involving CSDP missions receives a fraction of the news attention. NATO gathers 6,770,000 hits. 
Former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana garners 91,500 hits 
and his successor, Catherine Ashton, 85,300. The term “EU crisis management mission” gets 4,280 hits. The 
term “CFSP” receives 686 hits and the term “CSDP” gets 158 hits. 7 These numbers may be artificially low 
because they are acronyms. Adding all the hits in Google News archives for all the CSDP missions results in 
a total number of 24,975 hits. In percentages, using the largest possible numbers, that is the almost 25,000 
total hits for all CSDP missions, the missions garnered 0.35 per cent of the media attention that the EU and 
NATO received, and about 15 per cent of the attention that the CFSP High Representative (combining their 
totals) received during the same time period. One NATO mission, ISAF (Afghanistan), received 158,000 hits, 
or more than six times the news coverage for all the CSDP missions combined. Nevertheless, most NATO 
missions also receive little coverage. The problem lies in the nature of the missions: they are poor vehicles 
for self-promotion.
 3.1 Methodology: Assessing the Media Coverage of CSDP Missions
Just how much media coverage have the CSDP missions garnered? In a content analysis, in 2011, the author 
and her research assistant placed the official names of every CSDP mission into three separate databases: 
Lexis/Nexis Academic (Lexis); World News Connection (WNC), formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS); and the Google News archive. Lexis/Nexis has a database of over 10,000 global news sourc-
es.8 WNC, operated by the Open Source Center, an agency of the U.S. government, has thousands of non-
U.S. media translated into English, with a particular emphasis on local media coverage.9 Google News 
covers more than 25,000 news sources worldwide (Cohen 2009). By using three different databases, the 
researchers were able to triangulate their findings. Both the author and her assistant went over the articles 
to ensure proper and consistent coding.
Due to language barriers, this research project only utilized articles in English or translated into English. 
Both Lexis and WNC databases have extensive archives of English-language articles, translated and other-
wise. Despite this limitation, the search yielded thousands of newspaper articles, press releases, broadcast 
transcripts, and various opinion pieces from news sources around the world. In order to ensure the analysis 
of only relevant articles, that is on the specific CSDP mission in question as opposed to, for example, piracy 
7  On 3 October 2013, the author placed these terms into Google News archives (2004 to present) to get the widest 
possible number of hits.
8  http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexisnexis-academic.page. LexisNexis covers both English and non-En-
glish major world publications plus wire services, broadcast transcripts, magazines, journals, and newsletters.
9  For more information, see http://wnc.fedworld.gov/description.html.
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off the coast of Somalia in general, all missions search terms included only the official mission name (e.g. 
EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Congo) and date restrictions when necessary (e.g. the multiple EUPOL missions in 
Congo). Although some relevant articles might have been missed using this tactic, most articles on CSDP 
missions do mention the mission by name. Moreover, the point of the study was to discover how often 
the EU’s missions were highlighted as opposed to missions where the member state was highlighted. So 
as to catch any reference to a specific mission and in order to count as many relevant results as possible, 
we looked for the specific terms throughout the article, as opposed to searching within the headline and 
lead. The content analysis necessarily excluded press selections, governmental journals and reports, and 
industry reports due to time constraints and relevance to search terms and parameters.
In order to conduct a content analysis, such a large volume of articles, more than 15,000 in the LexisNexis 
and World News Connection databases, necessitated the use of random sampling for the various missions. 
The analytical criteria for missions with a high volume (over 150) of articles called for a sampling of 100 
articles, regardless of the sample size. The criteria also stressed the need to randomly select articles based 
on a logical, linear basis. For example, the EUFOR Althea mission in the WNC search yielded 266 hits, so 
every second article comprised the random sample for the content analysis (articles 2, 4, 6, etc.). Missions 
with fewer that 150 hits necessitated a content analysis of all available articles so as to ensure the best 
possible outcome for statistical analysis. Since there is no feasible way to exclude the irrelevant types of 
publications within the search parameters in the respective search engines, whenever press selections or 
other similarly excluded types of articles appeared in the results, the next possible relevant article was 
analyzed and the pattern of randomly selecting articles resumed at the predetermined interval.
Slight differences in the two search engines necessitated slightly different search methods on occasion. For 
example, the WNC database only goes back ten years, thus explaining the lack of articles for the European 
Community/Union Monitoring Mission (ECMM/EUMM), the Balkans monitoring mission. Furthermore, 
Lexis allowed for sorting of the articles by date, starting with the earliest available date. WNC sorted arti-
cles by date but only allowed for sorting starting with the latest date. While not ideal, the content analysis 
of the WNC articles for each mission began with the most recent articles and progressed to the earliest. 
Analysis from Lexis sources began with the earliest possible articles and progressed from there. With re-
gard to Lexis/Nexis, we did not specify a region so as to cast the net as wide as possible. We chose to search 
for the words as natural language. Whereas LexisNexis will display no number of hits larger than 3,000, the 
other databases had no such restrictions.
Coding for each article consisted of eleven different variables: date, official mission name, perspective, 
coverage tone, country of origin for the publication, length of the article (number of sentences), length of 
the actual coverage on the mission (number of sentences), word count, search engine utilized, article type 
(news, analysis, opinion, or press release), and publication. WNC searches included inflated word counts 
due to the presence of reprinted leads, and expansive tags and search terms. In order to remain consis-
tent, all numbers for the word count variable are reproduced as given by the respective search engines. 
Identifying information present in each article allowed for straightforward coding for other variables (date, 
country of origin, length of articles, length on action, search engine, and publications). The researchers 
manually counted the sentences for the length of the article and length on the action.
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The variables of coverage tone, article type, and perspective required strict coding criteria due to the sub-
jective nature of the variables. Coverage tone of the articles consisted of either positive or negative coding. 
Positive articles reported on the progress of the respective missions, analyzed the process and outcomes 
of the missions, or characterized the missions in any sort of positive or neutral way. In other words, the 
results are skewed towards the positive. Negative articles focused almost entirely on mission setbacks. 
Mission deaths, local population casualties due to the mission presence, serious administrative obstacles 
(on the EU, international, and national levels), and/or tactical and strategic obstacles were the indicators 
for negative coverage tone. The strict criteria for coding articles as negative were necessary in order to 
properly classify articles in the instance where the majority of the coverage remained positive or neutral.
Article type consisted of four categories: news, analysis, opinion, and press releases. In most cases, the 
identifying information in the article identified the proper article type. When the publisher or search en-
gine failed to provide the information within the article, a thorough reading of the articles coupled with 
comparison to previously categorized articles provided sufficient information to determine the correct 
article type.
Perspective of the article proved to be the most difficult to code. Perspective consisted of three different 
categories: national, international, or European. Due to perspective overlap, in particular between the 
European and international perspectives, the analytical criteria needed to be thorough. For an article to 
be considered European in perspective, the majority of the article had to report on the significance of the 
mission with regard to the EU, issues regarding European coordination and decision-making, or states’ role 
both with and within the EU or Europe as a whole. For an article to be considered international in perspec-
tive, the article needed to cover the larger geopolitical ramifications of the respective missions (namely 
with regard to the UN, NATO, or other international organizations; also, the larger realms of international 
or regional security), or relations of the country in which the mission was taking place with the number 
of applicable international institutions or states. For an article to be considered national in perspective, it 
needed primarily to cover individual states’ experiences with the missions, namely in the form of budget-
ary and operational concerns and progress. Undoubtedly, some articles could be classified as international 
or European, or national or European, but the criteria served to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible.
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 3.2 Content Analysis Data
MISSION  LEXIS NEXIS 
WORLD NEWS 
CONNECTION 
GOOGLE NEWS 
Archives
EUTM Somalia 72 18 142
EUNAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) 336 482 1,720
EUNAVCO Somalia 4 0 8
EUMM Georgia 518 106 577
EULEX Kosovo 3,000+ 2,728 8,790
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 16 11 12
EUFOR TCHAD Chad 1,494 367 1,220
EUPOL Afghanistan 400 69 1,060
EUPOL Congo 104 8 210
EUFOR RD Congo 522 103 1,130
EUPT Kosovo 27 9 40
EUPAT Macedonia 7 3 8
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian terri-
tories 124 13 64
EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova 179 36 27
EUBAM Rafah 95 17 231
AMM Aceh 658 107 935
Support to AMIS Sudan 122 64 2,580
EUJUST LEX Iraq 86 11 52
EUSEC Congo 74 10 263
EUPOL Kinshasa Congo 50 4 124
EUFOR Althea Bosnia 275 266 4,430
EUPOL Proxima Macedonia 16 191 45
ARTEMIS Congo 459 82 380
CONCORDIA Macedonia 327 205 569
EUPM Bosnia 890 308 355
ECMM/EUMM Balkans 3 1 3
TOTAL 9,858+ 5,219 24,975
In raw figures, the CSDP missions got very little play in traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio, 
and television. Of all the missions, only EULEX Kosovo had hit number in the thousands in all three data-
bases. Only eight missions out of 26 had hits in the hundreds in all three databases. 
Of the 3010 articles analyzed, only 89 were analysis (3 percent), 200 were press releases (6 percent), 65 
were opinion pieces (2 percent), three were blogs and the rest was news (88 percent). There were no edito-
rials. 21 percent were coded as European in perspective (626/3,010), 52 percent (1,564/3,010) were inter-
national in their coverage of the missions, and 27 percent (820/3,010) took a national perspective. Average 
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length on the missions themselves was 14.3 lines, but only 715 out of the 3,010 articles (24 percent) had 
more than ten lines on the missions themselves. In terms of words, only 233/3,010 or 8 percent of articles 
that mentioned the missions at all were over 1,000 words in length. In other words, in-depth discussion or 
analysis of the missions themselves was extremely limited.
France and Belgium led the pack both in terms of total number of articles about these missions and the 
average number of articles for each mission. In terms of article length, Germany was the lead country with 
Denmark and Belgium close behind.
Turning to the tone of coverage, for most countries the tone was overwhelmingly positive. Denmark was 
the exception, but there were so few articles that this statistic could be an anomaly. For all of the other 
countries, coverage was at least 70 percent positive and was above 90 percent positive for most of the 
countries. Germany had the lowest percentage of positive articles (among countries with a sufficiently 
large enough number of articles to analyze) with 71.7 percent with Spain, U.K., France, Ireland, and Austria 
having positive coverage in the 80 percent range. 
Regarding the missions, the five missions that received the most press coverage from EU countries were:
 Artemis Congo          
 EUfor Congo          
 EUfor Tchad           
 EUNAVfor Atalanta         
 EUPOL Afghanistan
Each of these missions had over a hundred articles written about them. Most of the coverage of these 
missions was overwhelmingly positive. A few missions had coverage that ranged in the 70 percent positive 
range, which is low considering that the average coverage for the missions was 93 percent positive. Some 
of the other missions, especially those about which only a few articles were written, had 100 percent posi-
tive coverage. Most of the other missions had 90 percent positive coverage or more. The four missions that 
might constitute “problem” missions are those with coverage in the 70 percent range:
 EUFOR Tchad           
 EULEX Kosovo          
 EUNAFOR Atalanta         
 EUPOL Afghanistan
The coverage of these missions was statistically much lower than the others, especially considering that the 
average coverage was 93 percent positive. Nevertheless, the coverage was still overwhelmingly positive. 
This figure could indicate massive approval of the missions as well little debate or little interest. In general, 
the missions with the most press coverage also got the most negative coverage. In other words, no news is 
good news, but also, good news is no news.
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Is the poor media coverage due to a deficiency on the EU side or from a structural problem that affects 
international organizations sponsoring crisis management issues in general? NATO makes an excellent 
comparator because both the EU and NATO have similar membership, 21 European countries are mem-
bers of both organizations, and because they have both participated in similar missions in similar areas, for 
example in former Yugoslavia and off the Horn of Africa. 
Most comparator missions in NATO received similar numbers in the hundreds as the EU missions, with the 
exceptions of the major military intervention in Afghanistan that numbered in the thousands in all three 
databases, and had numbers in five or six figures. The similar numbers would indicate that the problem lies 
not with the EU, but with the missions themselves.
COMPARATOR NATO          
OPERATIONS  LEXIS NEXIS 
WORLD NEWS 
CONNECTION 
GOOGLE NEWS 
Archives
ISAF (Afghanistan) 3,000+ 9,596 158,000
“Essential Harvest” (in Mace-
donia) 1,536 96 722
“Amber Fox” 323 100 114
“Allied Harmony” 47 100 94
“Allied Protector” 207 94 74
Pakistan earthquake relief 994 193 1,140
“Active Endeavour” (detecting 
and deterring terrorist activi-
ty in the Mediterranean) 170 91 513
KFOR NATO (Kosovo) 997 2,569 21,300
“Unified Protector” NATO (Lib-
ya) 1,000 127 2,830
NTM-I (Iraq) 202 10 198
“Eagle Assist” 53 0 31
Ocean Shield (Piracy off the 
Horn of Africa) 999 87 1,550
4. Why CSDP Missions are Poor Vehicles for EU Promotion 
Interviews with EU officials and press officers support these findings. None were surprised at the low 
coverage. CSDP missions are poor vehicles for EU promotion because the very nature of CSDP missions 
hinders press coverage for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. In other words, CSDP missions are 
politically sensitive, making news coverage imprudent or even impossible. The member states, that take 
the risk to send soldiers, also take the lion’s share of credit when the mission is successful and blame the EU 
when there is a problem. Finally, the missions’ very location makes it difficult for journalists to cover, even 
when a crisis management mission is successful.
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The fact that CSDP missions are the product of secret, multilateral negotiations dealing with politically 
sensitive crises means that the very construction of press releases and statements is fraught with danger 
as the wrong word could jeopardize the mission itself. First, they often begin as secret negotiations among 
diplomats behind closed doors. Therefore, there can be no build up in the press from the EU side. Moreover, 
peace building is more likely to succeed if the facilitator has a low profile. The protagonists will be more 
likely to participate in a conference if they get the credit for the peace agreement rather than the EU or 
another international organization, non-governmental organization or other intermediary. In other words, 
EU promotion could endanger the mission. Such is the case for any crisis management mission: whether 
the UN, the EU, or NATO, the interlocutor must be discreet. 
Institutionally, once the situation is brought to the attention of EU member states, new closed-door negoti-
ations begin to win the necessary support of the 27. With unanimity the standard, agreement can be time 
consuming. Moreover, agreement does not mean that costs are shared: all CSDP missions are de facto coa-
litions of those willing to give donations and volunteers. To solidify support, the missions are often done on 
the cheap; PR is seldom a priority. As a result, the member states that participate use their well-established 
press offices to take the credit, sometimes at the expense of the EU.
Logistically, it is expensive and dangerous for international and European journalists to cover the missions 
as they are, by definition, in the middle of a crisis and often, quite remote. The local press in the region is 
usually not very active because the crisis has curtailed freedom of press, or it was not very well developed 
in the first place, or both. In addition, the Brussels-based press officer may not speak the local language 
making interaction with local journalists difficult. 
 4.1 Secrecy + Low Profile = Poor Public Relations Opportunities
The origins of the EU’s Aceh mission are a perfect example of the need for secrecy in getting a crisis man-
agement mission off the ground. Peace had been elusive for decades, but a chance encounter with Finnish 
national Juha Christensen put the settlement on track. Christensen and his wife received posts as interna-
tional language researchers sent to Sulawesi, an island in Indonesia, with the goal of charting the over 100 
regional languages. In doing so, he learned Behasa Indonesia fluently and made life-long friendships. 
In the late 1990s, he became interested in Aceh, and, as luck would have it, met Farid Husain, Deputy 
Minister for Social Affairs. Husain was known for his role in settling earlier crises on other islands, and in 
a subsequent meeting in 2003, Christensen told him that he had contacts with the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM), the Acehnese rebel group in Stockholm. In this discussion, former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari’s name was first raised as a possible mediator. What Christensen did not know was that Jusuf 
Kalla, Indonesia’s Vice President, had charged Husain with the secret task of making new contacts with the 
GAM leadership in Sweden. The Government of Indonesia was open to peace negotiations, but with stories 
of human rights abuses and a legacy of failed talks, it did not want to make its overtures public (Merikallio 
2008 : 28-29). The issue was too politically sensitive.
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The political sensitivity meant that the negotiations required secrecy. Merikallio has several photos of 
members of the GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) standing in the snow, in January 2005, while 
partaking in closed negotiations at the Koeningstedt Manor in Vantaa, Finland. When asked why the talks 
took place in Finland, Ahtisaari answered, “it was necessary that the parties be isolated from the press.” He 
explained the situation as mutually exclusive: “Both mediation team and parties had a choice – be nice to 
the press or work to try to solve real problems and find an agreement (Aguswandi/Large 2008: 23). Only 
Ahtisaari spoke to the press, and only to say that the two sides were meeting. Ahtisaari explained: “There is 
always a great temptation for the parties to use the media in the negotiations. But if we start to announce 
via the media that we have demanded this or that of the other party, finding a solution will become ever 
more difficult” (Merikallio 2008: 22).
It was at this time that the EU was raised as a possible monitor for any peace agreement. The fact that the 
exiled GAM leaders were also naturalized Swedish citizens made the EU involved. Yet, these negotiations 
had to occur behind closed doors; they could not have succeeded in the public eye. Therefore, there could 
be no build up in the press of the EU’s involvement in the mission. Any possibility of EU promotion was lost.
Keeping a low profile was conducive to a successful operation. Such was the lesson learned in the Council 
document of 2008 that drew on the Aceh experience. Recognizing the sensitive political environment 
and that the “mere deployment of such missions can sometimes trigger political reactions and/or create 
expectations”, crisis missions must be planned in a confidential manner, to the point that transparency 
“may have to be sacrificed, at least in the early stages” (Council of the European Union 2009). Using CSDP 
missions to promote the EU could very well compromise the success of the missions themselves; the EU 
cannot be seen to take too much credit for the peace process. As Ahtisaari explained: “That is why I always 
praise the parties for the fact that this is an agreement between them. Nobody wants to be reminded 
afterwards that an outsider was needed to take care of their affairs. I learned that already in Namibia” (as 
cited in Merikallio 2008 : 141).
 4.2 Institutional Constraints: Member States Take the Glory
All CSDP missions are politically sensitive by definition, if for no other reason than that all the EU member 
states have different national interests. The Treaty on European Union sets out very clear decision making 
procedures with the perhaps contradictory goal of speaking with a common voice on international events, 
while at the same time, not forcing a national capital’s hand. As a result, all foreign and security policy de-
cision making is characterized by diplomatic negotiations behind closed doors guided by specific processes 
to ensure no government will be publicly embarrassed or put under public pressure to change its policy. 
The press is not allowed in. Instead, once a decision is made, the PSC negotiates the wording of a press 
release to make sure all the nuances carefully wrought from the closed-door deliberations are properly 
conveyed in the media. 
European Parliament President Martin Schulz attributed the lack of positive media coverage to such se-
crecy: “Why do EU institutions meet behind closed doors [sic]. Everything that happens behind closed 
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doors is anonymous and leaves open great room for interpretation.” He suggested this only prolongs the 
practice of member states blaming the EU when things go wrong and taking credit for positive develop-
ments (Mahony 2013). Christoph Meyer made a similar observation in 1999 noting that the EU’s commu-
nication deficit is used by member states to shift blame to the EU (Meyer 1999).
In her work on European public diplomacy, Mai’a Davis Cross argued that member states are to blame for 
the low level of EU foreign policy exposure “because national-level public diplomacy rarely includes the EU 
in its messages to foreign publics” (Davis Cross 2011). Why is this the case? With regard to CSDP missions, 
it is because member states bear almost all the risks, and so take the lion’s share of the ‘profits’, that is the 
credit when a mission is successful. Most missions have a lead country, and that lead country will often 
coordinate press coverage at home using the government’s large and sophisticated press office. In contrast, 
CSDP missions must manage on their own with very few people. Significantly, since the first CSDP mission, 
the number of press officers, even today, has never exceeded four people. 
Initially, there was no funding for press relations. In 2003, a few months into the first CSDP mission, EUPM 
Bosnia, the police mission, a German journalist knocked on the door of the headquarters and asked to 
speak with the press officer. When told the mission had none, the journalist volunteered and took the 
post.10 It would be another four years until there was audio-visual for Council missions.11 Traditionally, the 
Council secretariat had no communication budget because there was no need: the member states each 
had their own press team, and the Council did not implement policy like the Commission or debate it like 
the Parliament. However, Solana recognized that alongside the greater responsibility of running CSDP mis-
sions came the responsibility of explaining the missions to the public. Nevertheless, getting a line item for 
communication in the budget was problematic. PRINCE (Information Programme for EU Citizens) funding 
was for Commission projects; member states already had their own teams. Solana’s press team was com-
posed of one spokesperson and three officers, a total of four people.
Solana found a way to build a communications budget into each joint action, alongside funding for trans-
portation and supplies. When asking member states for personnel, some states would volunteer press 
officers, usually for a total of three. These three people would have no previous knowledge of either each 
other or the mission, and would have to be trained by Solana’s press team in Brussels12. 
With so few funds, public relations was mostly an afterthought. The Council sent just one press officer to 
Aceh. Not only did he have to put all his costs, flight, hotel, etc., on his personal credit card until the official 
agreement and budget could be signed, but once he arrived, there was no office, and therefore no office 
equipment. In the beginning, the EU subsisted on a shared computer and photocopier, and on the local 
World Bank office to check email. 13 
10  Interview with External Action Service official, 6 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium.
11  Interview with EU official III, 11 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium.
12  Interview with EU official I, 3 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium.
13  Interview with External Action Service official II, 7 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium
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Luckily for the mission, there was more press interest than initially expected because the tsunami had 
brought many reporters to Indonesia. While reporting on the recovery and rebuilding efforts, many jour-
nalists found out about the peace agreement and wanted to cover it at the same time. 
However, the press coverage could embarrass the parties involved as well. In many developing countries, 
where the majority of missions take place, the press is often not free. For example, foreign journalists and 
researchers require a special visa and approval of the topic ahead of time before entering Indonesia. To 
quote a retired General in Jakarta: “[Foreigners] take video pictures and speak unpleasant news around 
the province. The army’s job is to guarantee unity of Indonesia and we are willing to do everything to make 
sure of that” (Merikallio 2008: 68). Allowing in outsiders was a great risk for the government, but the gov-
ernment had little choice considering that so many foreigners and foreign journalists had already entered 
the country either to aid or to cover the tsunami. 
 4.3 Logistics: Location, Location, Location, and Timing
The remoteness of the CSDP operations also hindered international and European media coverage. Very 
simply, it is difficult for a journalist to get to the mission to report on it. For example, for the anti-piracy 
mission, Operation Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, a journalist would have to fly to Djibouti, a very 
expensive and time consuming itinerary, and, even if he or she did manage to get in touch with the naval 
ships in the Gulf of Aden, a very big ‘if’ considering the poor transportation infrastructure, the fact that the 
ships were at sea, the limited government in the region as well as piracy, there were no satellites available 
to get the story back to Europe. With limited budgets and limited time, journalists often choose to direct 
their energies elsewhere. Moreover, back home at military headquarters (HQ) in Norwood, England, the 
HQ had no desire to do media relations, especially considering that the headquarters was a secure building 
for guarding military secrets. However, Whitehall stepped in and insisted they speak to the press.14 
Using EUFOR Tchad as another example, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner sent his own press 
team accompanied by journalists, and paid for all their expenses. Par contre, Solana’s press officer had to 
find the money to take a commercial flight to N’Djamena and then find a helicopter to take her to Farchana, 
Abéché. EU publicity was not the primary goal of the French foreign ministry. Luckily, in that case, the head 
of mission was a telegenic Irishman who understood the importance of the media, especially in relations 
with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which was of extreme importance in the Chad mission. 
Solana’s office did pay to send journalists down a second time, but, although done all the time, it does bring 
up some ethical issues. 
The Council secretariat had its own strategy to get around the logistics issue. In 2007, they started sending 
in their own audio-visual teams to make footage for television broadcasts, always being sure to film sol-
diers speaking in their own language – Dutch, Danish, etc.-, and not the more widely spoken languages of 
English or French. The goal was to provide attractive footage for the local and national market. They would 
14  Interview with EU official I, 3 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium
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then call up national newspapers and say “Did you know there were Dutch soldiers in this CSDP mission?” 
Making the local connections was the only way to get on the news.15
With regard to the local media, in general, the missions get little press coverage for several reasons. First, 
very often, the crisis itself precludes the normal functioning of a local media. In other cases, the press is not 
free. Another issue is language: depending upon the region, there may not be people in the EU press office 
who speak the appropriate language to give interviews or to follow the local press coverage. The EU tries to 
send people with the pertinent linguistic skills, but sometimes it is not possible. In Aceh, the Brussels press 
officer was lucky that the UK embassy in Jakarta sent over a press officer, an Indonesian national named 
Faye Belnis, who could speak to local journalists in Behasa Indonesia. The Brussels-based press officer gave 
out statements in English.
Timing is also an issue. To quote Andy Warhol, everyone has his fifteen minutes of fame, that is, publicity 
has a limited window of opportunity. In general, crisis missions are most interesting for the first month; 
after that, they are old news. The same held for the Aceh Mission. The first phase of decommissioning of 
weapons happened from 15-17 September 2005 when 243 weapons were turned in by GAM and approved 
by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (AMM 2005). As one official described it, it was incredibly busy 
with over 100 interviews given out and photos taken.16 Then, the news moment was over, the photo ops 
of rebels handing over guns were gone. The seconded German diplomat went back to the Jakarta embassy 
after three weeks, and the journalists went home.17 
5. Conclusions: Successful Missions Require a Low Profile
In a briefing paper for the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) before the de-
ployment of the AMM, Amnesty International welcomed one of the goals of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in section 5.2 (d) to “monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in 
this field” (Amnesty International 2005). It exhorted the monitors to document any violations or breaches. 
In the end, no truth and reconciliation tribunal was established, and human rights was pushed to the 
back burner, but perhaps for the best. Schulze explains that the EU’s “lack of focus on implementing the 
human rights elements […] made it possible for the AMM to complete its mission in the sensitive context 
of Indonesia domestic politics,” and ascribes it as a “lesson learned” (Schulze 2007: 1). 
Justin Davies, Chief of Staff of the Monitoring Mission attributes AMM’s success to the principle of local 
ownership: 
AMM was a peacekeeping operation and the deployment of foreign monitors or missions is always 
a sensitive issue for a host country. Most of all, a successful peace process needs to be owned by the 
15  EU officials I and III corroborated this point.
16  Interview with Andre Scholz, German Foreign Ministry, email correspondence, 5 June 2012.
17  Interview with EAS official II in, 7 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium.
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parties and the population concerned, not by foreign bodies. This concept of local ownership is a guiding 
principle of ESDP and one of great importance to AMM (Davies 2010: 383).
Juha Christensen, the man who initiated the peace talks, believes in the importance of confidentiality to 
the peace process. He subsequently founded an NGO, PACTA, that highlights the value of private diplo-
macy: PACTA’s approach is based on “confidentiality whenever necessary, transparency whenever possible” 
(PACTA 2010).
These three principles: sensitivity to the political situation; local ownership of the peace process, and con-
fidentiality are key to a successful crisis management mission. All of these lessons learned focus on the 
need for the EU to be flexible, work in a secret environment, even to the point of sacrificing transparency, 
and keeping a low profile, if peace building is to succeed. In other words, EU self-promotion is at odds with 
successful crisis management. 
The EU is in a bind because Laeken Presidency conclusions asserted, rather melodramatically, that in order 
to bring the EU closer to its citizens, “the role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against 
all violence, all terror, and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heart-
rending injustices” (European Council 2001: 20). EU expeditions provide an opportunity for the EU to be 
‘seen’ internationally; they also provide an opportunity for the citizen to become wrapped up in the human 
element of the story as well. Moral justice plays a large role in the formation of a protagonist in the creation 
of a national, or in this case, a European narrative. In other words, the EU must be seen as the ‘good cop’ 
in the media and in public statements. As Dan Nimmo and James Combes explained, the news media very 
often fulfill social and psychological functions more than intellectual or intelligence functions (Nimmo/
Combs 1983, as cited in Bloom 1990: 177). Laurent Boussié, Correspondent for France 2 in the UK, noted 
at a conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute, that the “media typically focus on ‘sympathy’ and 
‘emotional’ issues without much regard for the whole truth” (as cited in Johnson II. 2005). By employing 
the “melodramatic imperative” in political news, i.e., describing international events as a dramatic story 
of good versus evil, of us versus them, the news creates an emotive force that can mobilize public opinion. 
Therefore, the viewer will identify with what is happening to the tourist, company, or diplomat internation-
ally and see it as personally affecting him or herself. Chosen judiciously, the right international event could 
increase the EU’s prestige and therefore enhance its identity (Bloom 1990: 48).
When carefully examined, perhaps one should not be surprised that successful crisis management runs 
counter to such a policy. If the EU is the ‘good’ cop, who, in a sensitive political environment, should be la-
beled the ‘bad’? Melodrama may make for good television, but melodrama and crisis management usually 
create tragedy. Placing the emphasis on the success of the mission is the right lesson learned.
Nevertheless, the European Union may not be able to continue its good work without being visible. The 
European taxpayer may balk at paying for such missions if he or she remains in the dark as to the good 
it does. Although European public opinion strongly supports a CSDP in general, the devil is in the details. 
Public support for an ESDP drops significantly once asked whether they are willing to pay for it. In 2004, 
although 71 percent of Europeans wanted the EU to become a superpower like the U.S., 47 percent of 
the 71 percent withdrew their support if that ambition meant an increase in military spending (German 
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Marshall Fund of the United States 2004). In other words, the people want the prestige of an EU force, but 
not the cost. 
The people may balk at the social cost as well. In its Long Term Vision, the European Defense Agency 
warned that finding public support for missions may become more and more difficult: “Governments and 
societies increasingly concerned for internal security and social cohesion may be even more hesitant to un-
dertake potentially controversial interventions abroad – in particular interventions in regions from where 
large numbers of immigrants have come” (European Defence Agency 2006).
Under these circumstances, one can understand why the EU and its member states have called for higher 
visibility for CSDP missions, but little can be done. Diplomacy is by definition the art of dealing with people 
in a sensitive and effective way. Tooting the EU’s horn at home might do some good, but it will not in navi-
gating a crisis. In any case, institutionally, the EU – as well as any organization – has little wiggle room: the 
member states who make the sacrifice want the credit.
Understanding the reasons behind this failure, whether it is a question of agency, that is whether the EU 
would be able to fix the problem by changing procedure, or whether it is structural, that is, intrinsic in 
the missions themselves, is vital to addressing the EU’s foreign policy goals. This paper concludes that the 
problem is structural: CSDP missions are poor vehicles for EU promotion because of political, institutional, 
and logistical reasons. If these missions inherently cannot fulfill their visibility function, the EU may want to 
rethink whether such risky ventures are still worthwhile.
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